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Developments in the Economics of Privatization and Regulation
Regulatory economics has become increasingly important over the last quarter of a century, in part as a result of the wave of privatization, starting in the UK, which made the regulation of monopoly of much greater interest. The discipline has also become more rigorous, increasingly employing powerful analytical and econometric methods. This volume brings together some of the leading contributions to the literature on this subject. The book is an invaluable resource for scholars, policymakers and regulators in the study of privatization and regulation.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
Regulatory economics has become increasingly important over the last quarter of a century, in part as a result of the wave of privatization, starting in the UK, which made the regulation of monopoly of much greater interest. The discipline has also become more rigorous, increasingly employing powerful analytical and econometric methods. This volume brings together some of the leading contributions to the literature on this subject. The book is an invaluable resource for scholars, policymakers and regulators in the study of privatization and regulation.
Contributors
21 articles, dating from 1983 to 2005
Contributors include: M. Armstrong, P. Kleindorfer, J.-J. Laffont, S. Littlechild, D. Sappington, A. Shleifer, J. Tirole, J. Vickers
Contributors include: M. Armstrong, P. Kleindorfer, J.-J. Laffont, S. Littlechild, D. Sappington, A. Shleifer, J. Tirole, J. Vickers
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Michael Crew and David Parker
PART I PRIVATIZATION
1. Andrei Shleifer (1998), ‘State versus Private Ownership’
2. Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti (2002), ‘Machiavellian Privatization’
3. Enrico C. Perotti (1995), ‘Credible Privatization’
4. Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997), ‘The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons’
5. Francesca Cornelli and David D. Li (1997), ‘Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control, and Optimal Schemes of Privatization’
6. Florencio López-de-Silanes (1997), ‘Determinants of Privatization Prices’
7. Steven L. Jones, William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash and Jeffry M. Netter (1999), ‘Share Issue Privatizations as Financial Means to Political and Economic Ends’
8. William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter (2001), ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization’
9. David M. Newbery and Michael G. Pollitt (1997), ‘The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain’s CEGB – Was It Worth It?’
10. David S. Saal and David Parker (2001), ‘Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales’
11. Lisa Harris, David Parker and Andrew Cox (1998), ‘UK Privatization: Its Impact on Procurement’
PART II REGULATION
12. Stephen C. Littlechild (1983), Regulation of British Telecommunications’
13. Mark Armstrong and David E.M. Sappington (2006), ‘Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization’
14. Roger Sherman (1993), ‘Should Ramsey-Price Markups Differ?’
15. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1996), ‘Creating Competition Through Interconnection: Theory and Practice’
16. Mark Armstrong, Chris Doyle and John Vickers (1996), ‘The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis’
17. Michael A. Crew, Chitru S. Fernando and Paul R. Kleindorfer (1995), ‘The Theory of Peak-Load Pricing: A Survey’
18. David E.M. Sappington (2005), ‘Regulating Service Quality: A Survey’
19. William W. Hogan (1992), ‘Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission’
20. Catherine Waddams Price and Ruth Hancock (1998), ‘Distributional Effects of Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets’
21. Stephen C. Littlechild (2002), ‘Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Michael Crew and David Parker
PART I PRIVATIZATION
1. Andrei Shleifer (1998), ‘State versus Private Ownership’
2. Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti (2002), ‘Machiavellian Privatization’
3. Enrico C. Perotti (1995), ‘Credible Privatization’
4. Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997), ‘The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons’
5. Francesca Cornelli and David D. Li (1997), ‘Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control, and Optimal Schemes of Privatization’
6. Florencio López-de-Silanes (1997), ‘Determinants of Privatization Prices’
7. Steven L. Jones, William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash and Jeffry M. Netter (1999), ‘Share Issue Privatizations as Financial Means to Political and Economic Ends’
8. William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter (2001), ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization’
9. David M. Newbery and Michael G. Pollitt (1997), ‘The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain’s CEGB – Was It Worth It?’
10. David S. Saal and David Parker (2001), ‘Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales’
11. Lisa Harris, David Parker and Andrew Cox (1998), ‘UK Privatization: Its Impact on Procurement’
PART II REGULATION
12. Stephen C. Littlechild (1983), Regulation of British Telecommunications’
13. Mark Armstrong and David E.M. Sappington (2006), ‘Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization’
14. Roger Sherman (1993), ‘Should Ramsey-Price Markups Differ?’
15. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1996), ‘Creating Competition Through Interconnection: Theory and Practice’
16. Mark Armstrong, Chris Doyle and John Vickers (1996), ‘The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis’
17. Michael A. Crew, Chitru S. Fernando and Paul R. Kleindorfer (1995), ‘The Theory of Peak-Load Pricing: A Survey’
18. David E.M. Sappington (2005), ‘Regulating Service Quality: A Survey’
19. William W. Hogan (1992), ‘Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission’
20. Catherine Waddams Price and Ruth Hancock (1998), ‘Distributional Effects of Liberalising UK Residential Utility Markets’
21. Stephen C. Littlechild (2002), ‘Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract’
Name Index
