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The Political Economy Of Financial Market Regulation |
Edited by Peter Mooslechner, Helene Schuberth and Beat Weber, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Austria
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| 2006 |
288 pp |
Hardback |
978 1 84542 518 0 |
$125.00 |
on-line discount
$112.50 |
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‘In this very nice volume reputed academics and central bankers discuss recent regulatory reforms in financial governance from a political economy perspective. Therefore it is invaluable for both policymakers and scholars interested in financial governance and market regulation.’
– Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, Centre for Economic Policy Research, UK and CESifo Research Network, Munich, Germany
This book focuses on recent financial market reforms, and their
implications for social, economic and political exclusion. In particular
it considers the hitherto under-researched question of whose interests
govern the design of regulatory mechanisms and who influences the
decision-making process. This process is set out as contested terrain,
in which there are winners and losers, and in which there are inevitably
circles of exclusion. The authors, comprising financial authority
experts and academic specialists, expand the concept of exclusion beyond
its typical social dimension to incorporate all actors, be they
individuals or institutions not permitted to contribute to financial
market regulation as a public good. As they point out, this may take the
form of political, economic or indeed cultural exclusion. The book
examines the conflicts that arise between various interests and how
these are managed within the process of regulation.
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Contents: Part I: The Theory of Financial Market Governance and the Problem of Inclusion and Exclusion Part II: Case Studies Index
Contributors: S. Lütz, P. Mooslechner, T. Porter, V. Redak, S.W. Schmitz, H. Schuberth, M. Schürz, E. Tsingou, G.R.D. Underhill, B. Unger, B. Weber
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