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Central Bank Independence, Targets And Credibility

Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy

Francesco Lippi

Francesco Lippi, Economist, Research Department, Bank of Italy With W. Letterie and O.H. Swank

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Description
‘Lippi’s book offers a number of very interesting extensions of the literature on central bank independence and credibility of monetary policy. The author combines a good knowledge of this topic with interesting new insights. No doubt, this book will be very useful for scholars in this rapidly developing research area.’
– Jakob de Haan, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence.

Contents
Contents: Preface 1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview Part I: Extensions of the Credibility Model 2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control 3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments 4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias 5. Policy Delegation and Elections Part II: Central Bank Independence and Targets 6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets 7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism Part III: Some Evidence 8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence References Index With W. Letterie and O.H. Swank