Central Bank Independence, Targets And Credibility
Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy
Francesco Lippi, Economist, Research Department, Bank of Italy With W. Letterie and O.H. Swank
Hardback £77.00 on-line price £69.30
This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence.
Contents: Preface 1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview Part I: Extensions of the Credibility Model 2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control 3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments 4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias 5. Policy Delegation and Elections Part II: Central Bank Independence and Targets 6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets 7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism Part III: Some Evidence 8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence References Index