The Political Economy Of Central Banking
Edited by Philip Arestis, University Director of Research, Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge and Fellow, Wolfson College, UK and Malcolm Sawyer, Professor of Economics, University of Leeds, UK
Hardback £86.00 on-line price £77.40
There have been rapid and substantial changes in the importance, economic power and operation of financial markets over the past three decades. This innovative book examines the control which central banks have over financial markets, focusing on the implications of the current trend towards the granting of ‘independence’ to central banks. The contributors examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. They also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.
Contents: Introduction 1. The Political Economy of Monetary Policy 2. How Credible are Credibility Models of Central Banking? 3. Some Problems with the use of ‘Credibility’ and ‘Reputation’ to Support the Independence of Central Banks 4. Unemployment Costs of Inflation Targeting 5. Leadership and Stability in Key Currency Systems: A Simple Game-theoretic Approach 6. Coercing Credibility: Neoliberal Policies and Monetary Institutions in Developing and Transitional Economies 7. Credibility: Measurement and Impacts. Central Bank Experience and Euro-perspectives 8. The Political Economy of the European Central Bank 9. The Political Economy of Monetary Policy: The Effects of Globalization and Financial Integration on the EU 10. Same Tune, Different Words?: The Reaction Function of G7 Monetary Authorities 11. The Independence of Central Banks: The Case of Italy 12. Wicksellian Norm, Central Bank Real Interest Rate Targeting and Macroeconomic Performance 13. New Zealand’s Experience with an Independent Central Bank Since 1989