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Competition, Contracts And Electricity Markets
A New Perspective
Jean-Michel Glachant
, Dominique Finon
, Adrien de Hauteclocque
Edited by Jean-Michel Glachant, Holder of the Loyola de Palacio Chair on EU Energy Policy and Director, Florence School of Regulation, European University Institute, Italy, Dominique Finon, Directeur de Recherche CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement, CNRS and EHESS, Paris, France and Adrien de Hauteclocque, Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg
| 2011 336 pp Hardback 978 1 84980 479 0 |
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| ebook isbn 978 1 84980 480 6 |
Hardback £89.95 on-line price £80.96
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Series: The Loyola de Palacio Series on European Energy Policy
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Description
This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles.
Contents
Contributors: J. Boucher, G. Brunekreeft, D. Finon, J.-M. Glachant, L. Hancher, A. de Hauteclocque, P. Longva, F. Marty, R. Meade, G. Meunier, M. Mulder, S. O’Connor, J. Pillot, F.A. Roques, Y. Smeers
Further information
Full table of contents
Contents:
Introduction Dominique Finon, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque
PART I: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS, INVESTMENT AND LONG-TERM EFFICIENCY 1. Energy Security and Long-term Arrangements Jacqueline Boucher and Yves Smeers
2. Long-term Contracts and Technology Choices in Electricity Markets Fabien A. Roques 3. Investment and Competition in Decentralized Electricity Markets: How to Overcome Market Failure by Market Imperfections? Dominique Finon
4. Comparison of Long-term Contracts and Vertical Integration in Decentralized Electricity Markets Richard Meade and Seini O’Connor
5. Vertical Relations and Energy Networks: Selected Issues Gert Brunekreeft
PART II: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 6. Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from Theoretical Models Guy Meunier
7. Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Long-term Contracting and Risk Management from the Point of View of a Large Consumer Petter Longva
8. Competition and Long-term Contracts in the Dutch Electricity Market Machiel Mulder
PART III: COMPETITION POLICY AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 9. Long-term Contracts and Competition Policy in European Energy Markets Adrien de Hauteclocque and Jean-Michel Glachant
10. Long-term Contracts and State Aid: A New Application of the EU State Aid Regime or a Special Case? Leigh Hancher
11. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in European Competition Policy: The Case of the Energy Sector Adrien de Hauteclocque, Frédéric Marty and Julien Pillot
PART IV: CONCLUSION 12. Efficiency, Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Summary and Conclusions of the Workshop Organized by the GIS LARSEN and the Loyola de Palacio Program of the European University Institute, Florence, 15–16 January 2009 Adrien de Hauteclocque
Index
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