International Handbook On The Economics Of Corruption, Volume Two

‘Volume Two of the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption presents a comprehensive, detailed, and in-depth analysis of corruption as well as its economic and policy implications. . . It will be a valuable resource not only for experts and students of corruption studies, but also for public officials, NGO employees, and scholars of economic and political development throughout the world.’
– Ararat L. Osipian, Journal of Economic Issues

A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.

Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions.

This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development.

Contents:

Introduction
Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide

PART I: GENERAL OVERVIEWS
1. Corruption and Sustainable Development
Toke S. Aidt

2. Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions
Joshua D. Potter and Margit Tavits

PART II: PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION
3. Delusion, Deception and Corruption in Major Infrastructure Projects: Causes, Consequences and Cures
Bent Flyvbjerg and Eamonn Molloy

4. Corruption and Collusion: Strategic Complements in Procurement
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

5. A Fighting Chance Against Corruption in Public Procurement?
Gustavo Piga

PART III: PRIVATIZATION AND SELF-DEALING IN PRIVATE FIRMS
6. Public versus Private Governance and Performance: Evidence from Public Utility Service Provision
Maria Vagliasindi

7. Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption
Emmanuelle Auriol and Stéphane Straub

8. Risks of Wrongdoing in Public Companies and Ways to Cope with Them: The Case of Brazil
Dante Mendes Aldrighi

PART IV: PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
9. Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation
Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis

10. Is There an Anti-corruption Agenda in Regulation? Insights from Colombian and Zambian Water Regulation
Frédéric Boehm

PART V: MICRO-ANALYTIC RESEARCH: HOUSEHOLD AND FIRMS
11. Field Experimentation and the Study of Corruption
Leonid V. Peisakhin

12. Oil, Corruption, and Vote-buying: A Review of the Case of São Tomé and Príncipe
Pedro C. Vicente

13. Conflict and Corruption in International Trade: Who Helped Iraq Circumvent United Nations Sanctions?
Yujin Jeong and Robert J. Weiner

14. Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption
Shawn Cole and Anh Tran

15. Does Respondent Reticence Affect the Results of Corruption Surveys? Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria
Bianca Clausen, Aart Kraay and Peter Murrell

PART VI: POLICY INITIATIVES: CRITIQUES AND EVALUATIONS
16. On Best and Not So Good Practices for Addressing High-level Corruption Worldwide: An Empirical Assessment
Edgardo Buscaglia

17. Why Multi-Stakeholder Groups Succeed and Fail
Rory Truex and Tina Søreide

18. ‘Red Flags of Corruption’ in World Bank Projects: An Analysis of Infrastructure Contracts
Charles Kenny and Maria Musatova

19. Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption?
Francesca Recanatini

Index