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Personnel Economics
Over the past twenty years or so there has been a marked increase in the study of personnel issues by labour economists. These studies have explored such topics as incentives, compensation methods, human resource strategies and institutional structures, and have provided an insightful empirical literature rich in the creative use of new data. In these two volumes, the editors bring together many of the theoretical papers which were key in establishing personnel economics as a discipline within economics, as well as a selection of empirical studies which have been important in developing an understanding of the economics of human resource issues.
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Contributors
Contents
More Information
Over the past twenty years or so there has been a marked increase in the study of personnel issues by labour economists. These studies have explored such topics as incentives, compensation methods, human resource strategies and institutional structures, and have provided an insightful empirical literature rich in the creative use of new data. In these two volumes, the editors bring together many of the theoretical papers which were key in establishing personnel economics as a discipline within economics, as well as a selection of empirical studies which have been important in developing an understanding of the economics of human resource issues.
The editors have written an authoritative introduction to complement their selection.
The editors have written an authoritative introduction to complement their selection.
Contributors
43 articles, dating from 1962 to 2000
Contributors include: G.P. Baker, H.L. Carmichael, E. Fama, B. Holmström, K.J. Murphy, C. Prendergast, S. Rosen, J.E. Stiglitz
Contributors include: G.P. Baker, H.L. Carmichael, E. Fama, B. Holmström, K.J. Murphy, C. Prendergast, S. Rosen, J.E. Stiglitz
Contents
Contents:
Volume I: The Concepts
Acknowledgements
Introduction Edward P. Lazear and Robert McNabb
PART I THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A Basics
1. Gary S. Becker (1962), ‘Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis’
2. Stephen A. Ross (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’
3. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), ‘Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy’
4. Edward P. Lazear (1979), ‘Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?’
5. Bengt Holmström (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
6. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’
7. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower (1986), ‘Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider–Outsider Relations’
B Tournaments
8. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’
9. Sherwin Rosen (1986), ‘Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments’
10. Edward P. Lazear (1989), ‘Pay Equality and Industrial Politics’
C Measurement
11. Edward P. Lazear (1986), ‘Salaries and Piece Rates’
12. George P. Baker (1992), ‘Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement’
13. Margaret A. Meyer (1994), ‘The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment’
PART II THEORETICAL ISSUES: PUZZLES, ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS
14. H. Lorne Carmichael (1988), ‘Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?’
15. Charles Kahn and Gur Huberman (1988), ‘Two-sided Uncertainty and “Up-or-Out” Contracts’
16. Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear (1992), ‘Peer Pressure and Partnerships’
17. Canice J. Prendergast (1995), ‘A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations’
18. Sherwin Rosen (1992), ‘The Military as an Internal Labor Market: Some Allocation, Productivity, and Incentive Problems’
PART III THE JOB
19. Edward P. Lazear (1992), ‘The Job as a Concept’
20. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom (1994), ‘The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data’
21. Michael L. Wachter and Randall D. Wright (1990), ‘The Economics of Internal Labor Markets’
22. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman (1999), ‘A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms’
23. Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter and Jeffrey E. Harris (1975), ‘Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange’
PART IV PERSONNEL STRATEGY
24. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi (1997), ‘The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines’
25. Richard B. Freeman and Edward P. Lazear (1995), ‘An Economic Analysis of Works Councils’
26. Julio J. Rotemberg (1994), ‘Human Relations in the Workplace’
27. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), ‘The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies’
28. Renée M. Landers, James Rebitzer and Lowell J. Taylor (1996), ‘Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms’
Name Index
Volume II: Personnel Economics and Performance
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PIECE RATE PAY
1. Edward P. Lazear (2000), ‘Performance Pay and Productivity’
2. Beth J. Asch (1990), ‘Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters’
3. Sue Fernie and David Metcalf (1999), ‘It’s not What You Pay it’s the Way that You Pay it and that’s What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance’
4. Charles Brown (1990), ‘Firms’ Choice of Method of Pay’
PART II PROFIT SHARING AND TOURNAMENT PAY STRUCTURES, OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES
5. Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey (1998), ‘Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence’
6. Tor Eriksson (1999), ‘Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data’
7. Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman (1994), ‘Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production’
8. Daniel M.G. Raff and Lawrence H. Summers (1987), ‘Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?’
9. Jonathan S. Leonard (1987), ‘Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover’
10. David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald (1988), ‘Profit-Related Pay: Prose Discovered?’
11. Robert McNabb and Keith Whitfield (1998), ‘The Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement on Financial Performance’
PART III EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS
12. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’
13. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers’
14. Brian G.M. Main, Alistair Bruce and Trevor Buck (1996), ‘Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance’
15. Jonathan S. Leonard (1990), ‘Executive Pay and Firm Performance’
Name Index
Volume I: The Concepts
Acknowledgements
Introduction Edward P. Lazear and Robert McNabb
PART I THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A Basics
1. Gary S. Becker (1962), ‘Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis’
2. Stephen A. Ross (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’
3. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), ‘Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy’
4. Edward P. Lazear (1979), ‘Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?’
5. Bengt Holmström (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
6. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’
7. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower (1986), ‘Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider–Outsider Relations’
B Tournaments
8. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’
9. Sherwin Rosen (1986), ‘Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments’
10. Edward P. Lazear (1989), ‘Pay Equality and Industrial Politics’
C Measurement
11. Edward P. Lazear (1986), ‘Salaries and Piece Rates’
12. George P. Baker (1992), ‘Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement’
13. Margaret A. Meyer (1994), ‘The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment’
PART II THEORETICAL ISSUES: PUZZLES, ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS
14. H. Lorne Carmichael (1988), ‘Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?’
15. Charles Kahn and Gur Huberman (1988), ‘Two-sided Uncertainty and “Up-or-Out” Contracts’
16. Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear (1992), ‘Peer Pressure and Partnerships’
17. Canice J. Prendergast (1995), ‘A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations’
18. Sherwin Rosen (1992), ‘The Military as an Internal Labor Market: Some Allocation, Productivity, and Incentive Problems’
PART III THE JOB
19. Edward P. Lazear (1992), ‘The Job as a Concept’
20. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom (1994), ‘The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data’
21. Michael L. Wachter and Randall D. Wright (1990), ‘The Economics of Internal Labor Markets’
22. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman (1999), ‘A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms’
23. Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter and Jeffrey E. Harris (1975), ‘Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange’
PART IV PERSONNEL STRATEGY
24. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi (1997), ‘The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines’
25. Richard B. Freeman and Edward P. Lazear (1995), ‘An Economic Analysis of Works Councils’
26. Julio J. Rotemberg (1994), ‘Human Relations in the Workplace’
27. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), ‘The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies’
28. Renée M. Landers, James Rebitzer and Lowell J. Taylor (1996), ‘Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms’
Name Index
Volume II: Personnel Economics and Performance
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PIECE RATE PAY
1. Edward P. Lazear (2000), ‘Performance Pay and Productivity’
2. Beth J. Asch (1990), ‘Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters’
3. Sue Fernie and David Metcalf (1999), ‘It’s not What You Pay it’s the Way that You Pay it and that’s What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance’
4. Charles Brown (1990), ‘Firms’ Choice of Method of Pay’
PART II PROFIT SHARING AND TOURNAMENT PAY STRUCTURES, OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES
5. Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey (1998), ‘Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence’
6. Tor Eriksson (1999), ‘Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data’
7. Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman (1994), ‘Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production’
8. Daniel M.G. Raff and Lawrence H. Summers (1987), ‘Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?’
9. Jonathan S. Leonard (1987), ‘Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover’
10. David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald (1988), ‘Profit-Related Pay: Prose Discovered?’
11. Robert McNabb and Keith Whitfield (1998), ‘The Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement on Financial Performance’
PART III EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS
12. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’
13. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers’
14. Brian G.M. Main, Alistair Bruce and Trevor Buck (1996), ‘Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance’
15. Jonathan S. Leonard (1990), ‘Executive Pay and Firm Performance’
Name Index
