Economics Of Contract Law

‘This book will serve as the essential resource for anyone interested in the economic analysis of contract law. Baird has included both the iconic articles of the past and the recent works which define the cutting edge of scholarship in the area. This volume is that rare collection that offers a snapshot of the current academic learning across the field. It is both an invaluable resource for those first exploring the economic analysis of contract law as well as a useful reference for the initiated.’
– Robert Rasmussen, Vanderbilt University, US

This important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields. Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. The editor’s comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field.

Topics include: the economics of contracting; efficient breach and renegotiation; expectation damages and its alternatives; default rules and mass markets.

Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Douglas G. Baird

PART I CONTRACTING
1. Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott (1980), ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’
2. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1999), ‘Foundations of Incomplete Contracts’
3. Richard Craswell (1989), ‘Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising’
4. Eric A. Posner (2003), ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?’
5. Anthony T. Kronman (1978), ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts’

PART II EFFICIENT BREACH AND RENEGOTIATION
6. Steven Shavell (1980), ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’
7. William P. Rogerson (1984), ‘Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’

PART III EXPECTATION DAMAGES AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
8. Kathryn E. Spier and Michael D. Whinston (1995), ‘On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation’
9. Alan Schwartz (1979), ‘The Case for Specific Performance’
10. Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis (2004), ‘Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law’

PART IV DEFAULT RULES
11. Richard A. Posner and Andrew M. Rosenfield (1977), ‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’
12. Richard A. Epstein (1989), ‘Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract’
13. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1989), ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’
14. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Steven Shavell (1991), ‘Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale’

PART V MARKETS
15. Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde (1979), ‘Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis’
16. Sanford J. Grossman (1981), ‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality’
17. Richard A. Epstein (1975), ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’
18. Douglas G. Baird (2006), ‘The Boilerplate Puzzle’

Name Index